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tween the reaction and the physical harm."' The "arising out of the
employment" analysis fulfills this inquiry, while the use of the mean-
ing of' "accident" to grant or deny compensation simply avoids a
determination of causation. :" As a result of Ferguson, Louisiana
courts can now concentrate on deciding whether the injury "arose out
of" and occurred in the "course of the employment," thus permitting
the needed flexibility in their decisions.:7
Ronald R. Gonzales
STATE v. DOUGLAS: JUDICIAL "REVIVAL" OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE
Defendant, after a trial by jury, was convicted of inciting to riot.'
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict,'
citing its lack of authority)' On appeal, the Louisiana supreme court
dents." See, e.g., Matter of Kilmas v. Trans Carib. Air., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d
14, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961); Schecter v. State Ins. Fund., 6 N.Y.2d 506, 190 N.Y.S.2d
656, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959). See also J. Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165,
190 A. 836 (1937).
Other courts have simply denied compensation on a finding that the employ-
ment's connection with the injury was not proven. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire
& Rub. Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966); Brundage v. K.L. House Const. Co.,
74 N.M. 613, 396 P.2d 731 (1964); Shea v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 139 Ohio
St. 407, 40 N.E.2d 669 (1942).
On the other hand, some decisions have found the necessary employment connec-
tion to grant compensation. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Neal, 124 Ga. App. 750,
186 S.E.2d 346 (1971). These courts have in effect held that the injury "arose out of"
and in the "course of the employment."
:35. Page, Workmens Compensation Law-Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 28
NACCA L.J. 296, 306 (1961-62).
.36. Comment, 70 YALE L.,]. 1129, 1140 (1961).
37. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term- Workmen s Compensation, 24 LA. L. REv. 244, 249-50 (1964).
1. LA. R.S. 14:329.2 (Supp. 1969).
2. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 778.
3. The trial court was undoubtedly basing its ruling on State v. Hudson, 253 La.
992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969), and cases following that decision in which Code of Criminal
Procedure article 778 was declared to be of no effect due to its conflict with article XIX,
section 9 of the Louisiana constitution which states in part that "[t]he jury in all
criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt
or innocence, having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding
judge."
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held that the motion for a directed verdict is not violative of the state
constitution, thereby refusing to give effect to prior declarations of
unconstitutionality. State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485 (La. 1973).
Previously, in State v. Hudson4 the supreme court had held that
the motion for a directed verdict in jury trials was invalid under the
Louisiana constitution. The reversal of Hudson in the instant case
was based, alternatively, on a finding that prior declarations of un-
constitutionality were dicta, or on an overruling of prior holdings of
unconstitutionality.'
Even though the United States Supreme Court early recognized
the function of the judiciary to review the constitutionality of stat-
utes,' few cases have come before the courts and none have heretofore
been decided by the Louisiana supreme court which answers the
question whether a statute, once declared unconstitutional, can val-
idly be applied in a later case by overruling the prior holdings of
unconstitutionality.' Perhaps the most straightforward approach to
the effect given such a statute is the "void ab initio" theory, under
which an unconstitutional statute is considered as if it had no exist-
ence from the time of its enactment.' Apparently based on a belief
that the legislature has no power to enact a statute which violates a
constitutional provision,9 this basis of decision seems to preclude
later judicial recognition of the statute. While the "void ab initio"
doctrine works well when equitable considerations dictate that the
statute be treated as if it had never existed,'0 its purely doctrinal
approach breaks down when there has been reliance on the statute
which has given rise to vested rights," when the reliance is pleaded
4. 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969).
5. The court interpreted the text of the article, which states that in jury trials the
court may direct a verdict of not guilty "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction," as referring to situations where there is "no evidence" adduced to prove
the crime or an essential element thereof. This interpretation was apparently thought
necessary in order to make the granting of a directed verdict a "question of law" rather
than one of "fact" and therefore properly within the province of the trial judge. State
v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 490-91 (La. 1973).
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. See 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 1-8, 150-79 (1935).
8. See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (where the court
said "[ain unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had never been passed.")
9. 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 8-12 (1935).
10. It would seem that all effects of a criminal prosecution under a statute later
found to be unconstitutional should be removed, insofar as possible, and the statute
tested as if it had never existed.
11. A typical situation would be one in which the parties have contracted in
reliance on a statute which is later found to be unconstitutional. It would seem unfair
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as a defense to otherwise tortious conduct," or in other situations in
which the statute should reasonably be taken into account in decid-
ing the controversy before the court. 3 In dealing with these situations
courts have sometimes taken the view that a statute will be presumed
a valid and enforceable enactment until such time as it is declared
unconstitutional.14 At other times they have declared that the consti-
tutionality of a statute must be considered on a case by case basis,
meaning, apparently, that the statute will be valid until declared
invalid in a specific case and it will then be invalid only for that
case.5
In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank," the
United States Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision that
had been based on the "void ab initio" doctrine:
It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualification. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such
a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored . . . and it is manifest from nu-
merous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. 7
This decision recognizes that a statute, though enacted contrary to a
constitutional provision, has existence, and a judicial declaration
that it is contrary to a constitutional provision does not retroactively
negate this existence.
In Leisy v. Hardin" the United States Supreme Court struck
down a portion of an Iowa statute which prohibited sales of liquor in
the "original package" as being an infringement on the commerce
power reserved to Congress. Subsequently, in In re Rahrer'" petitioner
attacked his conviction under a similar Kansas statute which made
to penalize either party when they have acted on the good faith belief that the legisla-
tion was valid.
12. A common situation arises when a law enforcement officer makes an arrest on
the basis of a statute that is later declared unconstitutional. Treating the statute as if
it had "no existence" would make it very difficult for the officer to explain his conduct
under the circumstances.
13. See generally 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (1935).
14. If not given full effect as a valid law, the statute will at least be given effect
as an operative fact to be considered in the determination of the case.
15. See, e.g., Shephard v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887).
16. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
17. Id. at 374.
18. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
19. 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
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all liquor sales unlawful. But in the interim, Congress had passed the
"Wilson Act,"" which granted power to the states to regulate such
commerce. Thus the court held that the Kansas statute was valid and
enforceable as written and it was unnecessary to reenact that portion
of the statute which had been previously unenforceable. In reaching
this decision, the Court recognized the existence of the statute and
took the position that the congressional act removed an "obstacle"
which had heretofore prevented its full enforcement.
This is not the case of a law enacted in the unauthorized exercise
of a power exclusively confided to Congress, but of a law which
it was competent for the state to pass, but which could not oper-
ate upon articles occupying a certain situation until the passage
of the act of Congress. That act in terms removed the obstacle,
and we perceive no adequate ground for adjudging that a reenact-
ment of the state law was required before it could have the effect
upon imported which it had always had upon domestic prop-
erty.2
Although this language seems to imply that there may be situations
in which an act would be void and reenactment required for it to be
effective, that situation was not presented. More important, in the
present context, is the notion that removal of an "obstacle" allows
enforcement of a statute without further legislative action. Though
the Rahrer case dealt with a statute that was previously unenforce-
able only by implication, it seems to stand for the proposition that
an unconstitutional statute need not always be unenforceable if the
cloud of unconstitutionality can somehow be removed.
Prior Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject of judicial revival
of a statute seems to be limited to declaration of the "void ab initio"
theory. In Jefferson v. Jefferson,2 comparing a rule of court to a
statute, the court, in dicta, said:
when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law
.. .the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree
changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitu-
tionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the
Court-an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by
the Constitution.2 3
In the instant case the majority, through Justice Barham, fo-
20. 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1970).
21. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 565 (1891).
22. 244 La. 493, 153 So. 2d 368 (1963).
23. Id. at 501, 153 So. 2d at 370.
[Vol. 34
NOTES
cused its discussion on the constititionality of the directed verdict
statute in supporting the holding that the statute was not violative
of the Louisiana constitution, 4 and on the proposition that the prior
holding of unconstitutionality was "mere dictum."25 The alternative
ground for the decision, that the statute may be reinstated by over-
ruling prior decisions, was relegated to a short paragraph in the opin-
ion.2" Cited in support of this reinstatement was West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,7 in which the United States Supreme Court overruled
Adkins v. Children's Hospital" without discussing the status of the
previously invalidated statute.29
In Douglas the court seems to have adopted the position that the
statute rendered unenforceable by Hudson was now valid because the
"new" interpretation given it removed any bar to its enforceability.
This reasoning appears to be a doctrinally sound approach to judicial
review of statutes. If any controversy before the court involves two
conflicting principles of law, one embodied in the constitution and
one embodied in a statute, then the statutory principle must yield.
If the court later reinterprets either provision obviating the conflict,
then the statute can be enforced in the future without reenactment;
it was not previously "invalidated," but simply not enforced because
it was erroneously believed that the constitution prevented enforce-
ment. The later decision regarding the constitutionality can be given
retroactive effect under the traditional theory that it is a correct
statement of the law as it has always existed." However, the decision
can be given only prospective application under the "Sunburst doc-
trine"'" which recognizes the competency of state courts to limit the
24. State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 490-91 (La. 1973).
25. Id. at 490.
26. This reinstatement was supported by a footnote which, after again disclaiming
belief that the article had been declared unconstitutional, states that there would be
"no problem in reinstating the article since it obviously does not involve any concern
with substantive retroactivity. Therefore the case may be overruled, and if the law were
invalidated, it can be reinstated." Id. at 491 n.6.
27. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
28. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
29. The status of the statute was considered shortly thereafter in an opinion by
the Attorney General of the United States, who concluded that the statute was valid.
39 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 22 (1937). That view has been acted on by Congress in amending
the statute without reenactment. D.C. CODE § 36-401 through 419 (1973). The same
result was reached by the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1952).
30. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32-33 (1930).
31. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). For a
recent Louisiana supreme court case applying this doctrine see Barnett v. Develle, 289
So. 2d 129 (La. 1974).
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effect of their decision to only future cases. The change of a statute
from "constitutional" to "unconstitutional" or from "unconstitu-
tional" to "constitutional" is not a change in the statute nor a change
in the constitution; it is a change in judicial decision interpreting
both and should be treated accordingly.
Mark Graham
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURERS-A DUTY TO INSPECT?
Plaintiff, injured at work when a cable on a crane broke, sued his
employer's workmen's compensation insurance carrier as a third-
party tortfeasor, alleging that the insurer had gratuitously under-
taken to inspect the working premises, and in so doing negligently
failed to detect and remove the cause of plaintiffs injuries. The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held since there was no un-
dertaking by the insurance carrier either gratuitous or contractual to
inspect for plaintiff's benefit it owed him no legal duty. Kennard v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 277 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973).
Whether the employer's workmen's compensation insurer can be
liable as a third-party tortfeasor has been the subject of much contro-
versy.' More often than not the decisions have turned on the question
of the insurer's immunity under the exclusive remedy provisions2 of
the workmen's compensation acts, probably because the courts
1. See, e.g., Beasley v. McDonald Eng. Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So. 2d 844 (1971);
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); Fabricius v.
Montgomery Elev. Co., 254 Iowa 1311, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963); Smith v. American
Empl. Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Theus,
493 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1972); Kerner v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391,
151 N.W.2d 72 (1967). See generally 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 72.90 (1970).
2. Some state workmen's compensation statutes explicitly grant to the workmen's
compensation insurer the same immunity from third-party tort actions that is enjoyed
by the employer by means of the exclusive remedy provision. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.03 (2) (Supp. 1961), amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (1957), which provides
that "the right to the recovery of compensation pursuant to this chapter shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and the workmen's compensation insurance
carrier." This particular provision was interpreted in Kerner v. Employer's Mutual
Liability Insurance Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W.2d 72 (1967) and discussed in a
comparison with Michigan law in Ray v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 10 Mich. App.
55, 158 N.W.2d 786 (1968). Cf. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950), which states in part: "The
rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of a
personal injury . . . shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such em-
ployee .... "
